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Abstract. This paper revisits the construction of Universal One-Way Hash
Functions (UOWHFs) from any one-way function due to Rompel (STOC 1990).
We give a simpler construction of UOWHFs, which also obtains better efﬁciency
and security. The construction exploits a strong connection to the recently
introduced notion of inaccessible entropy (Haitner et al. STOC 2009). With this
perspective, we observe that a small tweak of any one-way function f is already
a weak form of a UOWHF: Consider F(x,i) that outputs the i-bit long preﬁx of
f(x). If F were a UOWHF then given a random x and i it would be hard to come
up with x
   = x such that F(x,i)=F(x
 ,i). While this may not be the case, we
show (rather easily) that it is hard to sample x
  with almost full entropy among
all the possible such values of x
 . The rest of our construction simply ampliﬁes
and exploits this basic property.
With this and other recent works, we have that the constructions of three
fundamental cryptographic primitives (Pseudorandom Generators, Statistically
Hiding Commitments and UOWHFs) out of one-way functions are to a large
extent uniﬁed. In particular, all three constructions rely on and manipulate
computational notions of entropy in similar ways. Pseudorandom Generators rely
on the well-established notion of pseudoentropy, whereas Statistically Hiding
Commitments and UOWHFs rely on the newer notion of inaccessible entropy.
Keywords: computational complexity, cryptography, hashing, target collision-
resistance, one-way functions
1 Introduction
Universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs), as introduced by Naor and Yung [10],
are a weaker form of collision-resistant hash functions. The standard notion of collision
resistance requires that given a randomly chosen function f
R  F from the hash family,
it is infeasible to ﬁnd any pair of distinct inputs x,x  such that f(x)=f(x ). UOWHFs
only require target collision resistance, where the adversary must specify one of the
inputs x before seeing the description of the function f. Formally:
  Supported by US-Israel BSF grant 2006060.
   Supported by NSF grant CNS-0831289 and US-Israel BSF grant 2006060.
   Supported in part by PSC-CUNY Award #6014939 40.Deﬁnition 1. A family of functions Fk = {Fz : {0,1}n(k)   {0,1}m(k)}z {0,1}k is a
family of universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs) if it satisﬁes:
1. Efﬁciency: Given z   {0,1}k and x   {0,1}n(k), Fz(x) can be evaluated in time
poly(n(k),k).
2. Shrinking: m(k) <n (k).
3. Target Collision Resistance: For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A,
the probability that A succeeds in the following game is negligible in k:
(a) Let (x,state)   A(1k)   {0,1}n(k)   {0,1} .
(b) Choose z
R   {0,1}k.
(c) Let x  R   A(state,z)   {0,1}n(k).
(d) A succeeds if x  = x  and Fz(x)=Fz(x ).
It turns out that this weaker security property sufﬁces for many applications. The
most immediate application given in [10] is secure ﬁngerprinting, whereby the pair
(f,f(x)) can taken as a compact “ﬁngerprint” of a large ﬁle x, such that it is infeasible
for an adversary, seeing the ﬁngerprint, to change the ﬁle x to x  without being detected.
More dramatically, Naor and Yung [10] also showed that UOWHFs can be used to
construct secure digital signature schemes, whereas all previous constructions (with
proofs of security in the standard model) were based on trapdoor functions (as might
have been expected to be necessary due to the public-key nature of signature schemes).
More recently, UOWHFs have been used in the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme [3]
and in the construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes from one-way
functions [4, 5].
Naor and Yung [10] gave a simple and elegant construction of UOWHFs from
any one-way permutation. Subsequently, Rompel [11] gave a much more involved
construction to prove that UOWHFs can be constructed from an arbitrary one-way
function, thereby resolving the complexity of UOWHFs (as one-way functions are
the minimal complexity assumption for complexity-based cryptography, and are easily
implied by UOWHFs).6 While complications may be expected for constructions from
arbitrary one-way functions (due to their lack of structure), Rompel’s analysis also
feels quite ad hoc. In contrast, the construction of pseudorandom generators from one-
way functions of [7], while also somewhat complex, involves natural abstractions (e.g.,
pseudoentropy) that allow for modularity and measure for what is being achieved at
each stage of the construction.
In this paper, we give simpler constructions of UOWHFs from one-way functions,
based on (a variant of) the recently introduced notion of inaccessible entropy [5]. In
addition, one of the constructions obtains slightly better efﬁciency and security.
1.1 Inaccessible Entropy
For describing our construction, it will be cleaner to work with a variant of UOWHFs
where there is a single shrinking function F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m (for each setting of
the security parameter k) such that it is infeasible to ﬁnd collisions with random inputs.
6 More details of Rompel’s proof are worked out, with some corrections, in [12, 9].That is, an adversary A is given a uniformly random x
R   {0,1}n, outputs an x  such
that F(x )=F(x), and succeeds if x   = x.7 Note that we can assume without loss of
generality that x  = A(x) is always a preimage of F(x) (A has the option of outputting
x in case it does not ﬁnd a different preimage); we refer to an algorithm A with this
property as an F-collision ﬁnder.
Our construction is based on an entropy-theoretic view of UOWHFs. The fact that
F is shrinking implies that there are many preimages x  available to A. Indeed, if we
consider an (inefﬁcient) adversary A(x) that outputs x  R   F 1(F(x)) and let X be a
random variable uniformly distributed on {0,1}n, then
H(A(X)|X) = H(X|F(X))   n   m,
where H(·|·) denotes conditional Shannon entropy. (See Section 2 for more deﬁnitional
details.) We refer to the quantity H(X|F(X)) as the real entropy of F 1.
On the other hand, the target collision resistance means that effectively only one
of the preimages is accessible to A. That is for every probabilistic polynomial-time F-
collision ﬁnder A, we have Pr[A(X)  = X] = neg(n), which is equivalent to requiring
that:
H(A(X)|X) = neg(n)
for all probabilistic polynomial-time F-collision ﬁnders A. (If A can ﬁnd a collision X 
with nonnegligible probability, then it can achieve nonnnegligible conditional entropy
by outputting X  with probability 1/2 and outputting X with probability 1/2.) We refer
to the maximum of H(A(X)|X) over all efﬁcient F-collision ﬁnders as the accessible
entropy of F 1. We stress that accessible entropy refers to an upper bound on a form
of computational entropy, in contrast to the H˚ astad et al.’s notion of pseudoentropy [7].
Thus, a natural weakening of the UOWHF property is to simply require a noticeable
gap between the real and accessible entropies of F 1. That is, for every probabilistic
polynomial-time F-collision ﬁnder A, we have H(A(X)|X) < H(X|F(X))    , for
some noticeable  , which we refer to as the inaccessible entropy of F.
1.2 Our Constructions
Our constructions of UOWHFs have two parts. First, we show how to obtain a function
with noticeable inaccessible entropy from any one-way function. Second, we show how
to build a UOWHF from any function with inaccessible entropy.
OWFs   Inaccessible Entropy. Given a one-way function f : {0,1}n   {0,1}m,
we show that a random truncation of f has inaccessible entropy. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
F(x,i) to be the ﬁrst i bits of f(x).
To see that this works, suppose for contradiction that F does not have noticeable
inaccessible entropy. That is, we have an efﬁcient adversary A that on input (x,i)
can sample from the set S(x,i)={x  : f(x )1...i = f(x)1...i} with almost-
maximal entropy, which is equivalent to sampling according to a distribution that is
7 It is easy to convert any such function F into a standard UOWHF family by deﬁning Fz(x)=
F(z + x).statistically close to the uniform distribution on S(x,i). We can now use A to construct
an inverter Inv for f that works as follows on input y: choose x0
R   {0,1}n, and then
for i =1 ,...,n generate a random xi
R   A(xi 1,i  1) subject to the constraint
that f(xi)1,···,i = y1,···,i. The latter step is feasible, since we are guaranteed that
f(xi)1,...,i 1 = y1,···,i 1 by the fact that A is an F-collision ﬁnder, and the expected
number of trials needed get agreement with yi is at most 2 (since yi   {0,1}, and y
and f(xi) are statistically close). It is not difﬁcult to show that when run on a random
output Y of f, Inv produces an almost-uniform preimage of Y . This contradicts the
one-wayness of f. Indeed, we only need f to be a distributional one-way function [8],
whereby it is infeasible to generate almost-uniform preimages under f.
Inaccessible Entropy   UOWHFs. Once we have a non-negligible amount
of inaccessible entropy, we can construct a UOWHF via a series of standard
transformations.
1. Repetition: By evaluating F on many inputs, we can increase the amount
of inaccessible entropy from 1/poly(n) to poly(n). Speciﬁcally, we take
Ft(x1,...,xt)=( F(x1),...,F(xt)) where t = poly(n). This transformation
also has the useful effect of converting the real entropy of F 1 to min-entropy.
2. Hashing Inputs: By hashing the input to F (namely taking F (x,g)=( F(x),g(x))
for a universal hash function g), we can reduce both the real (min-)entropy and the
accessible entropy so that (F ) 1 still has a signiﬁcant amount of real entropy, but
has (weak) target collision resistance (on random inputs).
3. Hashing Outputs: By hashing the output to F (namely taking F (x,g)=g(F(x))),
we can reduce the output length of F to obtain a shrinking function that still has
(weak) target collision resistance.
There are two technicalities that occur in the above steps. First, hashing the inputs
only yields weak target collision resistance; this is due to the fact that accessible
Shannon entropy is an average-case measure and thus allows for the possibility that the
adversary can achieve high accessible entropy most of the time. Fortunately, this weak
form of target collision resistance can be ampliﬁed to full target collision resistance
using another application of repetition and hashing (similar to [1]).
Second, the hashing steps require having a fairly accurate estimate of the real
entropy. This can be handled similarly to [7, 11], by trying all (polynomially many)
possibilities and concatenating the resulting UOWHFs, at least one of which will be
target collision resistant.
A More Efﬁcient Construction. We obtain a more efﬁcient construction of UOWHFs
by hashing the output of the one-way function f before truncating. That is, we
deﬁne F(x,g,i) = (g,g(f(x))1···i). This function is in the spirit of the function that
Rompel [11] uses as a ﬁrst step, but our function uses three-wise independent hash
function instead of n-wise independent one, and enjoys a much simpler structure.8 Our
analysis of this function is signiﬁcantly simpler than Rompel’s and can be viewed as
8 Rompel started with the function f
 (z,g1,g 2) := (g2(f0(g1(z))),g 1,g 2), where g1 and g2
are n-wise independent hash-functions, and f0 is deﬁned as f0(x,y,i)=( f(x),y
n i,0
i).providing a clean abstraction of what it achieves (namely, inaccessible entropy) that
makes the subsequent transformation to a UOWHF much easier.
WeobtainimprovedUOWHFparametersoverourﬁrstconstructionfortworeasons.
First, we obtain a larger amount of inaccessible entropy: (logn)/n bits instead of
roughly 1/n4 bits. Second, we obtain a bound on a stronger form of accessible entropy,
which enables us to get full target collision resistance when we hash the inputs, avoiding
the second ampliﬁcation step.
This construction yields better parameters than Rompel’s original construction.
A one-way function of input length n yields a UOWHF with output length ˜ O(n7),
improving Rompel’s bound of ˜ O(n8). Additionally, we are able to reduce the key
length needed: Rompel’s original construction uses a key of length ˜ O(n12), whereas
our construction only needs a key of length ˜ O(n7). If we allow the construction to
utilize some nonuniform information (namely an estimate of the real entropy of F 1),
then we obtain output length ˜ O(n5), improving Rompel’s bound of ˜ O(n6). For the
key length, the improvement in this case is from ˜ O(n7) to ˜ O(n5). Of course, these
bounds are still far from practical, but they illustrate the utility of inaccessible entropy
in reasoning about UOWHFs, which may prove useful in future constructions (whether
based on one-way functions or other building blocks).
1.3 Perspective
The idea of inaccessible entropy was introduced in [5] for the purpose of constructing
statistically hiding commitment schemes from one-way functions and from zero-
knowledge proofs. There, the nature of statistically hiding commitments necessitated
more involved notions of inaccessible entropy than we present here — inaccessible
entropy was deﬁned in [5] for interactive protocols and for “generators” that output
many blocks, where one considers adversaries that try to generate next-messages or
next-blocks of high entropy. In such a setting, it is necessary to have the adversary
privately “justify” that it is behaving consistently with the honest party, and to
appropriately discount the entropy in case the adversary outputs an invalid justiﬁcation.
Here, we are able to work with a much simpler form of inaccessible entropy. The
simplicity comes from the noninteractive nature of UOWHFs (so we only need to
measure the entropy of a single string output by the adversary), and the fact that we
can assume without loss of generality that the adversary behaves consistently with the
honest party. Thus, the deﬁnitions here can serve as a gentler introduction to the concept
of inaccessible entropy. On the other hand, the many-round notions from [5] allow for
a useful “entropy equalization” transformation that avoids the need to try all possible
guesses for the entropy. We do not know an analogous transformation for constructing
UOWHFs. We also note that our simple construction of a function with inaccessible
entropy by randomly truncating a one-way function (and its analysis) is inspired by the
the construction of an “inaccessible entropy generator” from a one-way function in [5].
Finally, with our constructions, the proof that one-way functions imply UOWHFs
now parallels those of pseudorandom generators [7, 6] and statistically hiding
commitments [4, 5], with UOWHFs and statistically hiding commitments using dual
notions of entropy (high real entropy, low accessible entropy) to pseudorandom
generators (low real entropy, high pseudoentropy).2 Inaccessible Entropy for Inversion Problems
We will refer to several measures of entropy in this work (proofs are omitted due to
the lack of space). For a random variable X and x   Supp(X), we deﬁne the sample-
entropy of x with respect to X to be the quantity
HX(x) := log(1/Pr[X = x]).
Using this notion, we can deﬁne the Shannon entropy H(X) and min-entropy H (X)
as follows:
H(X) := E
x
R  X[HX(x)] and H (X) := minx Supp(X) HX(x)
We will also discuss the max-entropy H0(X) := log(1/|Supp(X)|). It can be shown
that H (X)   H(X)   H0(X) with equality if and only if X is ﬂat.
As discussed in the introduction, for a function F, we deﬁne the real entropy of
F 1 to be the amount of entropy left in the input after revealing the output.
Deﬁnition 2. Let n be a security parameter, and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m a function.
We say that F 1 has real Shannon entropy k if
H(X|F(X)) = k,
where X is uniformly distributed on {0,1}n. We say that F 1 has real min-entropy at
least k if there is a negligible function   =  (n) such that
Pr
x
R  X
 
HX|F(X)(x|F(x))   k
 
  1    (n).
We say that F 1 has real max-entropy at most k if there is a negligible function   =
 (n) such that
Pr
x
R  X
 
HX|F(X)(x|F(x))   k
 
  1    (n).
Note that more concrete formulas for the entropies above are:
HX|F(X)(x|F(x)) = log|F 1(F(x))| and H(X|F(X)) = E
 
log|F 1(F(X))|
 
.
As our goal is to construct UOWHFs that are shrinking, achieving high real entropy
is a natural intermediate step. Indeed, the amount by which F shrinks is a lower bound
on the real entropy of F 1:
Proposition 1. If F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m, then the real Shannon entropy of F 1 is at
least n m, and the real min-entropy of F 1 is at least n m s for any s =  (logn).
To motivate the deﬁnition of accessible entropy, we now present an alternative
formulation of real entropy in terms of the entropy that computationally unbounded
“collision-ﬁnding” adversaries can generate.
Deﬁnition 3. For a function F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m, an F-collision-ﬁnder is a
randomized algorithm A such that for every x   {0,1}n and coin tosses r for A,
we have A(x;r)   F 1(F(x)).Note that A is required to always produce an input x    {0,1}n such that F(x)=
F(x ). This is a reasonable constraint because A has the option of outputting x  = x if it
does not ﬁnd a true collision. We consider A’s goal to be maximizing the entropy of its
output x  = A(x), given a random input x. If we let A be computationally unbounded,
then the optimum turns out to equal exactly the real entropy:
Proposition 2. Let F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m. Then the real Shannon entropy of F 1
equals the maximum of H(A(X;R)|X) over all (computationally unbounded) F-
collision ﬁnders A, where the random variable X is uniformly distributed in {0,1}n
and R is uniformly random coin tosses for A. That is,
H(X|F(X)) = max
A
H(A(X;R)|X),
where the maximum is taken over all F-collision ﬁnders A.
The notion of accessible entropy simply restricts the above to efﬁcient adversaries,
e.g. those that run in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT for short):
Deﬁnition 4. Let n be a security parameter and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m a function. We
say that F 1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most k if for every PPT F-collision-
ﬁnder A, we have
H(A(X;R)|X)   k
for all sufﬁciently large n, where the random variable X is uniformly distributed on
{0,1}n and R is uniformly random coin tosses for A.
As usual, it is often useful to have an upper bound not only on Shannon entropy, but
on the max-entropy (up to some negligible statistical distance). Recall that a random
variable Z has max-entropy at most k iff the support of Z is contained in a set of size
2k. Thus, we require that A(X;R) is contained in a set L(X) of size at most 2k, except
with negligible probability:
Deﬁnition 5. Let n be a security parameter and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m a function.
For p = p(n)   [0,1], we say that F 1 has p-accessible max-entropy at most k if for
every PPT F-collision-ﬁnder A, there exists a family of sets {L(x)}x Supp(X) each of
size at most 2k such that x   L(x) for all x   Supp(X) and
Pr[A(X;R)   L(X)]   1   p
for all sufﬁciently largen, where random variable X is uniformly distributed on {0,1}n
and R is uniformly random coin tosses for A. In addition, if p =  (n) for some
negligible function  (·), then we simply say that F 1 has accessible max-entropy at
most k.
The reason that having an upper bound on accessible entropy is useful as an
intermediate step towards constructing UOWHFs is that accessible max-entropy 0 is
equivalent to target collision resistance (on random inputs):Deﬁnition 6. Let F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m be a function. For q = q(n)   [0,1], we say
that F is q-collision-resistant on random inputs if for every PPT F-collision-ﬁnder A,
Pr[A(X;R)= X]   q,
for all sufﬁciently largen, where random variable X is uniformly distributed on {0,1}n
and R is uniformly random coin tosses for A. In addition, if q =1   (n) for some
negligible function  (·), we say that F is collision-resistant on random inputs.
Lemma 1. Let n be a security parameter and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m be a function.
Then, for any p = p(n)   (0,1), the following statements are equivalent:
(1) F 1 has p-accessible max-entropy 0.
(2) F is (1   p)-collision-resistant on random inputs.
In particular, F 1 has accessible max-entropy 0 iff F is collision-resistant on random
inputs.
While bounding p-accessible max-entropy with negligible p is our ultimate goal,
one of our constructions will work by ﬁrst giving a bound on accessible Shannon
entropy, and then deducing a bound on p-accessible max-entropy for a value of p<1
using the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let n be a security parameter and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m be a function. If
F 1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most k, then F 1 has p-accessible max-entropy
at most k/p + O(2 k/p) for any p = p(n)   (0,1).
Once we have a bound on p-accessible max-entropy for some p<1, we need to apply
several transformations to obtain a function with a good bound on neg(n)-accessible
max-entropy.
Our second construction (which achieves better parameters), starts with a bound on
a different average-case form of accessible entropy, which is stronger than bounding the
accessible Shannon entropy. The beneﬁt of this notion it that it can be converted more
efﬁciently to neg(n)-accessible max-entropy, by simply taking repetitions.
To motivate the deﬁnition, recall that a bound on accessible Shannon entropy means
that the sample entropy HA(X;R)|X(x |x) is small on average over x
R   X and x  R  
A(x;R). This sample entropy may depend on both the input x and the x  output by the
adversary (which in turn may depend on its coin tosses). A stronger requirement is to
say that we have upper bounds k(x) on the sample entropy that depend only on x. The
following deﬁnition captures this idea, thinking of k(x) = log|L(x)|. (We work with
sets rather than sample entropy to avoid paying a log(1/ ) loss.)
Deﬁnition 7. Let n be a security parameter and F : {0,1}n   {0,1}m a function.
We say that F 1 has accessible average max-entropy at most k if for every PPT F-
collision-ﬁnder A, there exists a family of sets {L(x)}x Supp(X) and a negligible
function   =  (n) such that x   L(x) for all x   Supp(X), E[log|L(X)|]   k
and
Pr[A(X;R)   L(X)]   1    (n),
for all sufﬁciently largen, where random variable X is uniformly distributed on {0,1}n
and R is uniformly random coin tosses for A.We observe that bounding accessible average max-entropy is indeed stronger than
bounding accessible Shannon entropy:
Proposition 3. If F 1 has accessible average max-entropy at most k, then for every
constant c, F 1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most k +1 /nc.
3 Inaccessible Entropy from One-way Functions
In Section 3.1 we show that any one-way function can be very slightly altered into a
function with inaccessible entropy. In Section 3.2 we show that an additional hashing
step implies a stronger form of inaccessible entropy (which we can then use for a
more efﬁcient construction of UOWHF). Still, we ﬁnd the more direct construction
of Section 3.1 and its analysis to be striking in its simplicity.
3.1 A Direct Construction
Theorem 1 (Inaccessible Shannon entropy from one-way functions). Let
f : {0,1}n    {0,1}n be a one-way function and deﬁne F over {0,1}n   [n]
as F(x,i)=f(x)1,...,i. Then F 1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most
H(Z|F(Z))   1/(29 · n4 · log
2 n), where Z =( X,I) is uniformly distributed over
{0,1}n   [n].9
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exists a PPT F-collision-ﬁnder A such that
H(Z|F(Z))   H(A(Z;R)|Z) <   =1 /(29 · n4 · log
2 n)
for inﬁnitely many n’s, and R is uniformly distributed over the random coins of A.
Since I is determined by F(Z), and since Z also determines the second part of A’s
output (since A is an F-collision-ﬁnder), it follows that
H(X|F(Z))   H(A (Z;R)|Z) <  
where A  is the algorithm that on input (z;r) outputs the ﬁrst component of A(z;r)’s
output. In the following use A  to construct an efﬁcient algorithm that inverts f with
constant probability. We do so in two steps: 1. Constructing such an inverter under the
assumption that we have access to an (inefﬁcient) oracle SamIdeal deﬁned shortly, and
2. Showing how to efﬁciently approximate SamIdeal using A .
Algorithm 2 (SamIdeal)
Input: x   {0,1}n, i   [n] and b   {0,1}.
9 We believe that the actual gap between the real and accessible entropy of F
 1 is  (1/n
2), or
possibly even  (1/n), and not  (1/n
4) as stated. Since even the optimistic  (1/n) bound
does not yield as efﬁcient overall construction as the one resulting from Section 3.2, we defer
a tighter analysis to the ﬁnal version of the paper.Return a random x    F 1(F(x,i   1))1 such that f(x )i = b (re-
turn an arbitrarily value if no such x  exists), where F 1(F(x,j))1 =
{x    {0,1}n: F(x ,j)=F(x,j)}.
..............................................................................
That is, SamIdeal outputs uniformly at random x  such that f(x )1,...,i =
(f(x)1,...,i 1,b). We deﬁne an algorithm Inv with access to an oracle Sam. When
Sam = SamIdeal, it will be easy to argue that Inv inverts f with probability one.
Algorithm 3 (Inv
Sam)
Input: y   {0,1}n.
Oracle: Sam.
For i =1to n do:
let xi = Sam(xi 1,i,yi) (where x0 is chosen arbitrarily)
Output xn.
..............................................................................
It is immediate that Inv
SamIdeal inverts f with probability one. We now turn
to showing that A  can be used to efﬁciently approximate SamIdeal. The resulting
algorithm Sam  will be sufﬁciently similar to SamIdeal and as a result Inv
Sam  will
still invert f with high probability. A property of Inv that will come handy is that, on a
uniform value y = f(x), the ﬁrst coordinate of each individual query that the inverter
Inv
SamIdeal makes (i.e., xi) is uniform in {0,1}n (the queries are correlated of course).
Recall that the output of A  has high Shannon entropy - almost as high as the
uniform distribution over its set of prescribed outputs. Claim 3.1 (which is rather
standard), shows that this also implies that the distribution of A ’s output is statistically
close to this uniform distribution.
Deﬁnition 8. For     [0,1] let A  be the family of efﬁcient F-collision-ﬁnders with the
following guarantee: for every A     A  there exist inﬁnitely many n’s such that
  (Z,A  (Z;R))   (Z,F 1(F(Z))1)     , where R is uniformly distributed over the
random-coins of A   and F 1(F(x,i))1 is uniformly distributed over F 1(F(x,i))1.
Showing that the output of A  is statistically close to uniform can therefore be
formalized by showing the following claim:
Claim. A    A 
 .
Proof.
  (Z,F 1(F(Z))1)   (Z,A (Z;R))   =E
z Z
 
 F 1(F(z))1   A (z;R)) 
 
  E
z Z
  
H(F 1(F(z))1)   H(A (z;R))
 
 
 
E
z Z
 
H(F 1(F(z))1)   H(A (z;R))
 
=
 
H(X|F(Z))   H(A (Z;R))
 
 
 ,where the ﬁrst inequality uses the fact that if W is a random variable whose support
is contained in a set S and U is the uniform distribution on S, then  U   W    
H(U)   H(W). (See [2, Lemma 11.6.1].)
As we just shown that A    A 
  it is enough to show how to use an algorithm A     A 
to approximate SamIdeal (with error which depends on  ). In order to keep notation
simple, we abuse notation and denote by A  some A     A . Fix     [0,1] and consider
the following efﬁcient approximation of SamIdeal:
Algorithm 4 (Sam )
Input: x   {0,1}n, i   [n] and b   {0,1}.
Oracle: A .
Repeat 16n · logn times:
1. Let x  = A (x,i)
2. If f(x )i = b, return x .
Abort.
..............................................................................
Let Inv  denote Inv
Sam  and InvIdeal denote Inv
SamIdeal. We will show that the
output of Inv  (on a random value f(x)) is statistically close to that of InvIdeal. As
InvIdeal inverts f with probability one, we will conclude that Inv  inverts f with high
probability as well. To analyze the statistical distance between the outputs of the two
inverters, we consider hybrid inverters that use the ideal SamIdeal in the ﬁrst queries and
use Sam  in the rest of the queries: For i   [n + 1] let Inv
i
  be the variant of Inv that
uses SamIdeal in the ﬁrst i   1 queries and Sam  for the rest of the queries. The next
claim will allow us to easily bound the difference between the output distribution of any
two neighboring hybrid inverters:
Claim. Let i   [n] and let  i =
   (X,A (X,i;R))   (X,F 1(F(X,i))1)
   , then
 (X,SamIdeal(X,i,f(X)i))   (X,Sam (X,i,f(X)i))  1/2n + 16 · n · logn ·  i.
Proof. Sam  is imperfect for two reasons (which our analysis handles separately).
The ﬁrst reason is that Sam  relies on the output of A  that returns an inverse that
is only close to uniform (rather than fully uniform). The error accumulated in each
query to A  is  i and there are only 16 · n · logn such queries, which altogether
contributes 16·n·logn· i to the statistical distance bounded by the claim. The second
source of error is that after 16 · n · logn unsuccessful repetitions, Sam  aborts without
retrieving a correct inverse x . As we now argue, such failure will only happen with
small probability (contributing 1
2n to the bound in the claim).
To separate our analysis of the two sources of error, we start by considering
the case that  i =0 . Note that in this case A (x,i;R)=A0(x,i;R) is
identical to F 1(F(x,i))1. For x   {0,1}n, i   [m] and b   {0,1}, let
 (x,i,b) := Pr
y
R  f(X)[yi = b | y1,...,i 1 = f(x)1,...,i 1]. Note that for every i,
Pr[ (X,i,f(X)i)) <  ] <   for every   > 0. We also note that Sam (x,i,f(x)i)
aborts with probability at most (1  1
4n)16n·log n < 1
4n in the case that  (x,i,f(x)i)  1
4n, and that in case it does not abort, (since we assume that  i =0 ) it returns the same
distribution as SamIdeal(x,i,b) does. Hence, for the case that  i =0we have that
 (X,SamIdeal(X,i,f(X)i))   (X,Sam (X,i,f(X)i)) 
  Pr[ (X,i,f(X)i) <
1
4n
] + Pr[Sam (X,i,f(X)i) aborts |  (X,i,f(X)i)  
1
4n
]
<
1
4n
+
1
4n
 
1
2n
.
We now want to analyze the general case where  i may be larger than zero. The
statistical distance between the output distribution of Sam (X,i,f(X)i) in the case
 i =0and in the general case is at most the maximal number of calls to A  made by
Sam  times  (X,A (X,i))   (X,A0(X,i)) , we therefore have that
 (X,SamIdeal(X,i,f(X)i)   (X,Sam (X,i,f(X)i))) 
 
1
2n
+ 16n · logn ·  (X,A (X,i)   (X,A0(X,i) 
=
1
2n
+ 16n · logn ·
 
 (X,A (X,i)   (X,F 1(F(X,i))1))
 
 
=
1
2n
+ 16 · n · logn ·  i.
Now note that the i’th query of Inv
i
 (f(X)) (a query to Sam ) and the i’th query
of Inv
i+1
  (f(X)) (a query to SamIdeal) are both distributed as (X,i,f(X)i). Therefore
Claim 3.1 yields that for every i   [n],
 
 Inv
i+1
  (f(X))   Inv
i
 
 
   
1
2n
+ 16 · n · logn ·  i.
Hence,
Pr[Inv (f(X))   f 1(f(X))]
  1  
n  
i=1
 
 Inv
i+1
  (f(X))   Inv
i
 (f(X))
 
 
  1  
n  
i=1
1
2n
+ 16 · n · logn ·  (X,SamIdeal(X,i,f(X)i)   (X,Sam (X,i,f(X)i) 
 
1
2
  16 · n2 · logn ·  .
Let Inv be the instantiation of Inv  obtained when we implement Sam  using
A . Claim 3.1 yields that Pr[Inv(f(X))   f 1(f(X))]   Pr[Inv 
 (f(X))  
f 1(f(X))]   1/2   16 · n2 · logn ·
 
  > 1/4.3.2 A More Efﬁcient Construction
The following theorem shows that a simpliﬁed variant of the ﬁrst step of [11]
(which is also the ﬁrst step of [9]) yields inaccessible entropy with much stronger
guarantees than those obtained in Section 3.1. The function we construct is F(x,g,i)=
(g(f(x))1,...,i,g), where g : {0,1}n   {0,1}n is a three-wise independent function.
Since the composition of g and f is still a one-way function then Theorem 1 already
implies that F 1 has inaccessible entropy. The beneﬁts of the additional hashing step
are that 1. we get more inaccessible entropy ( ˜  (1/n) bits rather than ˜  (1/n4) bits), and
2. we get a bound on accessible average max-entropy rather than accessible Shannon
entropy. These allow for a simpler and more efﬁcient transformation of F into a
UOWHF.
Theorem 5 (Inaccessible average max-entropy from one-way functions). Let
f : {0,1}n    {0,1}n be a one-way function and let G = {g : {0,1}n   {0,1}n}
be a family of constructible,10three-wise independent hash functions. Deﬁne F with
domain Dom(F) := {0,1}n   G   [n] by
F(x,g,i)=( g(f(x))1,...,i,g).
Then, for every constant d, F 1 has accessible average max-entropy at most
H(Z|F(Z))   (dlogn)/n for every d>0, where Z =( X,G,I) is uniformly
distributed over Dom(F).
Proof. Let c be a sufﬁciently large constant (whose value we determine later, depending
ontheconstantdinthetheoremstatement)anddeﬁneforeveryy   {0,1}n andi   [n]:
L(y,i)=
 
y    {0,1}n:H f(X)(y )   (i + c · logn)   y  = y
 
.
(Recall that the sample entropy is deﬁned as Hf(X)(y) = log(1/Pr[f(X)=y]) = n 
log
   f 1(y)
   , so the “heavy” images, where f 1(y) is large, have low sample entropy.)
Namely, L(y,i) consists, in addition to y itself, of “i-light” images with respect to f.
We later show that the sets L (x,g,i)=f 1(L(f(x),i))   {(g,i)} satisfy the
properties required to show that the accessible max-entropy of F 1 is as stated in the
theorem.11 Towards this goal, we ﬁrst show that the only accessible inputs of F come
from preimages of L(y,i).
Claim. For every PPT F-collision-ﬁnder A and every constant c>0, it holds that
Pr[A1(X,G,I;R) /   f 1(L(f(X),I))]   neg(n),
where (X,G,I) is uniformly distributed over Dom(F), R is uniformly distributed over
the random coins of A, and A1 denotes the ﬁrst component of A’s output.
10 G is constructible if given the description of a function g   G and x   {0,1}
n, g(x) can be
computed in time poly(n), and there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that given
x   {0,1}
n, and y   {0,1}
n, outputs a random g
R   G such that g(x)=y.
11 We are working with the set L, and not with L
 , as it signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes notations. Note
that the sets L
  are independent of the adversary, even though the deﬁnition of accessible
average max-entropy allows the sets to depend on the adversary. Further, note that the sets L
are independent of G.Note that the above immediately yields that Pr[A(X,G,I;R) /   L (X,G,I)]  
neg(n), since the other two output components of A are required to equal (g,i), due to
the fact that F(x,g,i) determines (g,i).
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exist an efﬁcient F-collision-ﬁnder A,
c>0 and a non-negligible function   =  (n) such that Pr[A1(X,G,I;R) /  
f 1(L(f(X),I))]    . Fix a triple (x,i,r) and let
 x,i,r = Pr[A1(x,G;r) /   f 1(L(f(x),i))].
Deﬁne A (g)=A1(x,g;r). We will show how to use any such A  to invert f with
probability at least  x,i,r/nc. By picking (x,i,r) at random, we will invert f with
probability at least Ex,i,r[ x,i,r/nc]= /nc, which contradicts the one-wayness of
f. Our inverter works as follows, on input y   {0,1}n.
Inv(y): choose g uniformly at random from G subject to the constraint g(y)1···i =
g(f(x))1···i,12 and output A (g).
To analyze the success probability Inv, we ﬁrst rewrite the success probability of
A  as follows:
 x,i,r   Pr[A (G) /   f 1(L(f(x),i))
=
 
y/  L(f(x),i)
Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)]
=
 
y/  L(f(x),i)
Pr[G(y)1···i = G(f(x))1···i]
·Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)|G(y)1···i = G(f(x))1···i]
=2  i ·
 
y/  L(f(x),i)
Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)|G(y)1···i = G(f(x))1···i].
Above the second equality follows becauseA is an F-collision ﬁnder (so it is always the
case that x  = A (g)=A(x,g,i)1 has the property that g(f(x ))1···i = g(f(x))1···i),
and the third inequality follows by the two-wise independence of G (y/   L(f(x),i)
implies that y  = f(x)). Now, we can bound the success probability of Inv in ﬁnding a
preimage of Y = f(X) by:
Pr[Inv(Y )   f 1(Y )]
=
 
y
Pr[Y = y] · Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)|G(y)1···i = f(x)1···i]
 
 
y/  L(f(x),i)
Pr[Y = y] · Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)|G(y)1···i = f(x)1···i]
 
1
2i+clog n ·
 
y/  L(f(x),i)
Pr[A (G)   f 1(y)|G(y)1···i = f(x)1···i]
   x,i,r/nc,
12 This can be done by ﬁrst choosing z
R   {0,1}
n i and then using the constructibility of G to
generate a random g such that g(y)=( g(f(x))1···i,z).where the penultimate inequality holds because every y/   L(f(x),i) satisﬁes
Hf(X)(y) < (i + c · logn).
We have seen that sets f 1(L(y,i)) capture the accessible inputs of F; now it
remains to show that the expected logarithm of their size is sufﬁciently smaller than
the real entropy H(Z|F(Z)) = E[log|F 1(F(Z))|] (again, this property immediately
propagates to L ).
Claim. For every constant c>8, it holds that
E
 
log
   f 1(L(f(X),I))
    
  E
 
log
   F 1(F(Z))
    
   
 
clogn
n
 
,
where Z =( X,G,I) is uniformly distributed in Dom(F).
Proof. We assume for simplicity that n is a power of 2 (otherwise, we “pad” f) and that
c is a power of 2, and let c  = c/2. For ease of notation, we will work in entropy units
of c  logn. Namely, for i   {0,··· ,m= n/(c  logn)} and y   {0,1}n, let y{1},...,{i}
be the ﬁrst i · c  logn bits of y, deﬁne
Hf(y) :=
Hf(X)(y)
c  logn
.
and let
qi = Pr[Hf(f(X))   [i,i + 1)].
Recall that (X,G,I) is uniformly distributed in Dom(F). We deﬁne additional
random variables that categorize the “non trivial collisions” induced by F into two
separate categories:
Light := |{x    {0,1}n: f(x )  = f(X)   G(f(x )){1},...,{I} = G(f(X)){1},···,{I}
  Hf(f(x ))   I +2 }|.
Namely, Light consists of the preimages that collide with f(X), different from f(X),
and “light” — have few preimages. Similarly, let
Heavy := |{x    {0,1}n: f(x )  = f(X)   G(f(x )){1},...,{I} = G(f(X)){1},···,{I}
  Hf(f(x )) <I+2 }|.
Namely, Heavy consists of the preimages that collide with f(X), different from f(X),
and “heavy” — have many preimages. Note that
   F 1(F(Z))
    = Light + Heavy + |f 1(f(X))|
(recall that the all elements F 1(F(x,g,i)) are of the form (x ,g,i)) and
 
 f 1(L(f(X),I))
 
    Light + |f 1(f(X))|.Thus, we have
E[log
   F 1(F(Z))
   ]   E[log
   f 1(L(f(X),I))
   ] (1)
  E
 
log
Light + Heavy + |f 1(f(X))|
Light + |f 1(f(X))|
 
We manipulate this as follows:
E
 
log
Light + Heavy + |f 1(f(X))|
|f 1(f(X))| + Light
 
(2)
  E
 
log
 
1+
Heavy
|f 1(f(X))| + Light + Heavy
  
  E
 
Heavy
|f 1(f(X))| + Light + Heavy
 
,
where the last inequality uses the fact that log(1 +  )     for     1. The proof
of Claim 3.2 easily follows from the next claim, which yields that with constant
probability, Heavy is a signiﬁcant term in (|f 1(f(X))| + Light + Heavy).
Claim. Let     1, i   {0,...,m   1} and x   {0,1}n. Condition on I = i and
X = x, and deﬁne the following events (over the random variable G):
E1
i : (Light + Heavy)   3 · 2n i·(c
  log n)
E2
i : Heavy   (qi+1     ·
 
1/nc ) · 2n i·c
  log n 1
Then Pr[E1
i ]   2/3, and Pr[E2
i ]   1   4/ 2.
Proof. For E1
i , we note that E[Light + Heavy]   2n i·(c
  log n) by two-universality of
G, and apply Markov’s Inequality.
For E2
i , let
S := {x    {0,1}n: f(x )  = f(x)   Hf(f(x ))   [i +1 ,i+ 2)}.
Note that |S|   (qi+1   neg(n)) · 2n, where we subtract neg(n) for not taking into
account the preimages of f(x). For g   G, let
Sg := {x    {0,1}n: f(x )  = f(x)   Hf(f(x ))   [i +1 ,i+ 2)
  g(f(x )){1},...,{i} = g(f(x)){1},···,{i}},
note that (conditioned on I = i and X = x) Heavy   |SG|. We write
|Sg| =
 
y f(S) 1g,y ·| f 1(y)|, where 1g,y is the indicator for g(y){1},...,{i} =
g(f(x)){1},···,{i}. By the three-wise independence of G, the 1G,y’s are pairwise
independent Bernoulli random variables, each with expectation 2 i·c
  log n. Thus,
E[|SG|]   (qi+1 neg(n))·2n i·c
  log n. Assuming that qi+1 >  ·
 
1/nc   
 
1/nc 
(as otherwise the claim about E2
i holds trivially), it follows that
E[|SG|] >q i+1 · 2n i·c
  log n 1By the pairwise independence of 1G,y’s, we also have
Var[|SG|]=
 
y f(S)
Var[1G,y ·| f 1(y)|]
  2 i·c
  log n ·
 
y f(S)
 
 f 1(y)
 
 2
  2 i·c
  log n ·| S|· max
y f(S)
|f 1(y)|   2 i·c
  log n · 2n · 2n (i+1)·c
  log n
=
 
2
 
nc  · 2n i·c
  log n 1
 2
,
and thus by Chebyshev inequality
Pr[E2
i ]   Pr
 
|SG|   (qi+1     ·
 
1/nc ) · 2n i·c
  log n 1
 
  1   Pr
    |SG|   E[|SG|]
     
 
2
·
 
Var[|SG|]
 
  1  
4
 2.
Noting that Hf(f(X))   i means |f 1(f(X))|   2n i·(c
  log n), and applying
Claim 3.2 with   =4 , we have
E[log|F 1(F(Z))|]   E[log
 
 f 1(L(Y,I))
 
 ]
  E
 
Heavy
|f 1(f(X))| + Light + Heavy
 
 
1
m
·
m 1  
i=0
Pr[Hf(f(X))   i] · Pr[E1
i   E2
i | Hf(f(X))   i]
·
 
qi+1   4
nc /2
 
· 2n i·c
  log n 1
2n+2 i·(c  log n)
 
1
m
·
m 1  
i=0
(qi+1 + ··· + qm) ·
 
1  
1
3
 
1
4
 
·
 
qi+1   4/nc
 /2
8
 
 
1
48m
·
 
 
 
j,i {0,...,m}
qi · qj
 
    O
 
m
nc /2
 
 
1
48m
  O
 
m
nc /2
 
,
where the ﬁrst inequality is by Equation 2, and the third inequality holds since q0 =0
foreveryone-wayfunction,whichimpliesthat
 
1 i j m qi·qj =
 
0 i j m qi·qj  
1
2 ·
 
j,i {0,...,m} qi · qj. Thus, Claim 3.2 holds with respect to any c =2 c    8.
By Claims 3.2 and 3.2 and the fact that F(x,g,i) determines g and i, the sets
L (x,g,i)=f 1(L(f(x),i))   {(g,i)} satisfy the properties required to show that
the accessible max-entropy of F 1 is at most H(Z|F(Z))    (c(logn)/n). Taking c
to be a sufﬁciently large constant times d, completes the proof.4 UOWHFs from Inaccessible Entropy
In this section we show how to construct a UOWHF from any efﬁciently computable
function with a noticeable gap between real Shannon entropy and either accessible
average max-entropy or accesssible Shannon entropy. Recall that the more efﬁcient
construction from Section 3.2 satisﬁes the former, and the more direct construction
from Section 3.1 satisﬁes the latter. Combined with these constructions, we obtain two
new constructions of UOWHFs from any one-way function.
In both cases, we ﬁrst transform the entropy gap into a noticeable gap between real
Shannon entropy and accessible max-entropy. We begin with the construction that starts
from a gap between real Shannon entropy and accessible average max-entropy because
the transformation involves fewer steps (and is also more efﬁcient).
4.1 The More Efﬁcient UOWHF
Starting with any one-way function f : {0,1}n   {0,1}n, the ﬁnal UOWHF has
output length O(n7) and key length ˜ O(n7) (or O(n5) for both output and key lengths
for a non-uniform construction). Throughout, let s    (logn) denote any super-
logarithmic function.
STEP 0 (basic construction): Let F0 denote the function from Section 3.2. That is, F0
is deﬁned on domain {0,1}n   G   [n] as F0(x,g,i) = (g(f(x))1,...,i,g), where
f : {0,1}n    {0,1}n is a one-way function and G is a family of constructible,
3-wise independent hash functions over {0,1}n.
– F0 : {0,1} 
IN
0   {0,1} 
OUT
0 where  
IN
0 =  
IN
0 (n)=O(n) and  
OUT
0 =  
OUT
0 (n)=
O(n).
– Let kREAL denote the real Shannon entropy of F
 1
0 . Theorem 5 yields that the
accessible average max-entropy of F
 1
0 is bounded by kREAL     for   =
(logn)/n.
STEP 1 (gap ampliﬁcation): Let F1 be the t-fold direct product of F0. That is,
F1(x1,...,xt) = (F0(x1),...,F0(xt)) where t   O(n2s/ 2). Speciﬁcally, we
require that
tkREAL    
IN
0 ·
 
st   t · (kREAL    /2) +  
IN
0 ·
 
st +3 s.
This repetition increases both the real and accessible entropies of F1 by a factor
of t (comparing to F0). In addition, this repetition converts real Shannon entropy
to real min-entropy and accessible average max-entropy to accessible max-entropy
(up to additive terms that are sub-linear in t). More precisely:
– F1 : {0,1} 
IN
1   {0,1} 
OUT
1 where  
IN
1 (n)=t ·  
IN
0 = O(tn) and  
OUT
1 (n)=
t ·  
OUT
0 = O(tn).
– F
 1
1 has real min-entropy at least tkREAL    
OUT
0 ·
 
st, which by our choice of
t is at least t · (kREAL    /2) +  
IN
0 ·
 
st +3 s.
– F
 1
1 has accessible max-entropy at most t · (kREAL    )+ 
IN
0 ·
 
st.
From the next step on, the construction is given an additional parameterk (a “good”
estimate of kREAL) such that k   [kREAL,k REAL +  /2]. This means that:– F
 1
1 has real min-entropy at least t · (k    )+ 
OUT
0 ·
 
st +3 s.
– F
 1
1 has accessible max-entropy at most t · (k    )+ 
OUT
0 ·
 
st.
That is, there is a gap of 3s between real min-entropy and accessible max-entropy,
and moreover, we “know” where the gap is (given k).
STEP 2 (entropy reduction): Apply entropy reduction to F1 to obtain F2. That is,
F2(x,g)=( F1(x),g,g(x)), where g : {0,1} 
IN
1   {0,1}  is selected from a
familyof2-universalhashfunctions,where  =  (n,k)=t·(k  )+ 
IN
0 ·
 
st+s =
O(tn). This additional hashing reduces the real min-entropy and accessible max-
entropy by   (up to an additive term of s). More precisely,
– F2 : {0,1} 
IN
2   {0,1} 
OUT
2 where  
IN
2 (n,k)=O(tn) and  
OUT
2 (n,k)=O(tn).
– F
 1
2 has real min-entropy at least s.
– F
 1
2 has accessible max-entropy at most 0. Hence, F2 is collision-resistant on
random inputs (by Lemma 1).
STEP 3 (reducing the output length): First reduce the output length of F2 by hashing
the output to  
IN
2   logn bits. That is, F3(x,g) = (g,g(F3(x))) where g :
{0,1} 
OUT
2   {0,1} 
IN
2  log n is selected from a family of pairwise-independent hash
functions.
– F3 : {0,1} 
IN
3   {0,1} 
OUT
3 where  
IN
3 (n,k)=O(tn) and  
OUT
3 (n,k)= 
IN
3  
logn.
– F3 remains collision-resistant on random inputs.
Next, transform F3 into a family {Fy} of target collision-resistant hash functions
via a random shift. That is, Fy(x)=F3(y + x).
– This yields a non-uniform construction {Fy} with input length and key length
 
IN
3 (n,k)=O(tn)=O(n · n2s/ 2)=O(n5), where the non-uniformity
corresponds to choice of the parameter k   [kREAL,k REAL +  /2].
STEP 4 (removing non-uniformity): To remove the non-uniform advice k, we “try all
possibilities” from 0 to  
IN
0 (n) in steps of size  /2, similar to the approach used in
[11] (see also [9, Section 3.6]) :
i. First, we construct m =  
IN
0 (n) · 2/  families of functions {Fi
y} for i =
1,2,...,m, where {Fi
y} is the family of functions obtained by instantiating
Steps 1 through 3 with the parameter k set to the value i /2. This m families
of functions satisfy the following properties:
– Each of F1
y,...,Fm
y is length-decreasing; in particular, Fi
y has input
length  
IN
3 (n,i /2) and output length  
IN
3 (n,i /2)   logn. Note that
 
IN
3 (n,i /2)    
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)) for all i because  (n,k) increases as a
function of k. We may then assume that all m functions F1
y,...,Fm
y
have the same input length  
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)) and the same output length
 
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n))   logn by padding “extra part” of the input to the output.
– Atleastoneof{F1
y},...,{Fm
y }istargetcollision-resistant;thisisbecause
kREAL   [0, 
IN
0 (n)] so there exists some i for which i /2 lies between
kREAL and kREAL +  /2.ii. Next, for each i =1 ,2,...,m, we construct a family of functions { ˜ Fi
˜ y} from
{Fi
y} with input length m ·  
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)), key length O( 
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)) · logn)
and output length  
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)) logn, by following the construction given in
[13]. Again, at least one of { ˜ F1
˜ y1},...,{ ˜ Fm
˜ ym} is target collision-resistant.
iii. Finally, we deﬁne a family of functions {F˜ y1,...,˜ ym} to be the concatenation of
˜ F1
˜ y1,..., ˜ Fm
˜ ym on the same input. That is, F˜ y1,...,˜ ym(x)= ˜ F1
˜ y1(x) ···  ˜ Fm
˜ ym(x).
– Note that F has input length m ·  
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n)) and output length m ·
( 
IN
3 (n, 
IN
0 (n))   logn), so F is length-decreasing.
– Moreover, since at least one of { ˜ F1
˜ y1},...,{ ˜ Fm
˜ ym} is target collision-
resistant, {F˜ y1,...,˜ ym} must also be target collision-resistant. This is
because a collision for F˜ y1,...,˜ ym is a collision for each of ˜ F1
˜ y1,..., ˜ Fm
˜ ym.
This yields a uniform construction of a UOWHF with output length length O(n/ ·
n · n2s/ 2)=O(n7). and key length ˜ O(n/  · n · n2s/ 2 · logn)= ˜ O(n7).
4.2 UOWHF via a Direct Construction
Here, the ﬁnal construction has output length ˜ O(n36) (or ˜ O(n26) for a non-uniform
construction).
STEP 0 (basic construction): Let F0 denote the function from Section 3.1. That is,
F0 is deﬁned over {0,1}n   [n] as F0(x,i)=( f(x)1,...,i), where f : {0,1}n   
{0,1}n is a one-way function.
– F0 : {0,1} 
IN
0   {0,1} 
OUT
0 where  
IN
0 =  
IN
0 (n)   2n and  
OUT
0 =  
OUT
0 (n)  
2n.
– Let kREAL denote the real Shannon entropy of F
 1
0 . Theorem 1 yields that the
accessible Shannon entropy of F
 1
0 is at most kREAL  , where      (1/n4·
log
2 n)
STEP 1 (gap ampliﬁcation): Let F1 be the t-fold direct product of F0 for a sufﬁciently
large t to be determined later. That is, F1(x1,...,xt)=( F0(x1),...,F0(xt)).
This repetition increases both the real and accessible entropies of F1 by a factor of
t. In addition, the repetition converts real Shannon entropy to real min-entropy and
real max-entropy (up to an additive o(t) term). More precisely:
– F1 : {0,1} 
IN
1   {0,1} 
OUT
1 where  
IN
1 (n)=t ·  
IN
0 = O(tn) and  
OUT
1 (n)=
t ·  
OUT
0 = O(tn).
– F
 1
1 has real min-entropy at least t · kREAL   2n
 
st and real max-entropy at
most t · kREAL +2 n
 
st.
– F
 1
1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most t · kREAL   t .
From the next step on, the construction is given an additional parameterk (a “good”
estimate of kREAL) such that k   [kREAL,k REAL +  2/256n]. This means that:
– F
 1
1 has accessible Shannon entropy at most tk   t . This means F
 1
1 has
(1    /4k)-accessible max-entropy at most tk   t /2.STEP 2 (entropy reduction): Apply entropy reduction to F1 with   =  (n,k)=tk  
t /2+s to obtain F2. That is, F2(x,g)=( F1(x),g,g(x)), where g : {0,1} 
IN
1  
{0,1}  is selected from a family of 2-universal hash functions.
This reduces the accessible max-entropy to 0, which allows us to deduce that F2 is
weakly collision-resistant on random inputs.
– F2 : {0,1} 
IN
2   {0,1} 
OUT
2 where  
IN
2 (n,k)=O(tn +  (n,k)) = O(tn) and
 
OUT
2 (n,k)=O(tn +  (n,k)) = O(tn).
– F
 1
2 has real min-entropy at least t(kREAL   k +  /2)   2n
 
st   2s and real
max-entropy at most t(kREAL   k +  /2) + 2n
 
st.
– F
 1
2 has (1    /4k +2   (s))-accessible max-entropy at most 0. Thus, F2 is
q-collision-resistant on random inputsfor q =  /4k   2  (s).
STEP 3 (gap ampliﬁcation): F3 is t -fold direct product of F2, where t  = s/q =
O(ks/ )= ˜ O(n5). That is, F3(x1,...,xt )=( F2(x1),...,F2(xt )).
This allows us to amplify the weak collision-resistance property of F2 to obtain a
gap between real min-entropy and accessible max-entropy in F3.
– F
 1
3 has real min-entropy at least t  ·
 
t(kREAL   k +  /2)   2n
 
st   2s
 
,
which is at least:
t  ·
 
t( /2    2/256n)   2n
 
st   2s
 
.
– F
 1
3 has accessible max-entropy at most t  ·
 
(1 q/8)(t(kREAL  k + /2)+
2n
 
st)+1
 
, which is at most:
t  ·
 
t( /2    q/16) + 2n
 
st)+1
 
.
Now, k    
IN
0 (n)   2n, so q =  /4k 2  (s)    /8n 2  (s). This means
F
 1
3 has accessible max-entropy at most:
t  ·
 
t( /2    2/128n +2   (s))+2 n
 
st)+1
 
.
Note that the gap is at least t  ·
 
t· 2/256n 2  (s)  (4n
 
st+2s+1)
 
, which
is at least 3s as long as:
t ·  2/256n   2  (s) +4 n
 
st +2 s + 1 + 3s/t 
Since 3s/t  =3 q   3 , we can set t = O(n/  + ns/ 2 + n4s/ 4)= ˜ O(n20)
so that F
 1
3 has a gap of 3s between real min-entropy and accessible max-entropy,
and moreover, we know where this gap is (given k).
STEPS 4/5/6: We follow steps 2, 3, and 4 in the previous construction, with the
following modiﬁcations in the parameters:
– We apply entropy reduction ﬁrst, with
  = t  ·
 
t( /2    q/16) + 2n
 
st)+1
 
+ s.
– To remove the non-uniform advice k, we “try all possibilities” from 0 to
 
IN
0 (n)   2n in steps of size  2/256n.
We then obtain a non-uniform construction of UOWHFs with output length O(n ·
t · t )= ˜ O(n26) and a uniform construction with output length O(n/( 2/n) · n ·
t · t  · logn)= ˜ O(n36).Acknowledgements
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